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Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. Delta
Development Co.: Contra Non Valentem Applied to
Fiduciaries
A local parish governing authority brought an action against a
corporation and individual defendants to be declared owner of, or to
recover from them, certain mineral interests in parish-owned lands. The
pertinent elements of the plaintiff's petition alleged that two of the
individuals and their deceased father obtained the interests through
breaches of their fiduciary duties as both public officials and attorneys.
The corporate defendant's stock allegedly was wholly owned by either
the heirs or the donees of the deceased public official. The defendants
filed peremptory exceptions of prescription and admitted (for the res-
olution of the prescription issue only) the alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties.
The trial court found the suit to be a personal action subject to a
liberative prescription of ten years.' Because the prescriptive period on
an action to recover for the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties had
begun to run over thirty years before the suit was filed and had not
been interrupted or suspended, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the defendants. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed.2
The plaintiff then sought and was granted a writ of review by the
supreme court,3 assigning as error, inter alia, that the lower courts erred
in not applying the doctrine of contra non valentem agere nulla currit
praescriptio4 to defeat the defendants' exceptions of prescription. 'The
supreme court found that the doctrine was applicable, and thus, that
the plaintiff's cause of action had not prescribed. Plaquemines Parish
Commission Council v. Delta Development Co., 502 So. 2d 1034 (La.
1987).
The purpose of this paper is to review the various applications and
the present status of contra non valentem in Louisiana. The noted case
will then be analyzed to review the supreme court's application of the
doctrine. Initially, a brief history of the doctrine is necessary.
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 3499 (formerly La. Civ. Code art. 3544 (1870)).
2. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 486 So. 2d 129 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1986).
3. 189 So. 2d 909 (La. 1986).
4. Prescription does not run against one unable to act.
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HISTORY OF Contra Non Valentem IN LOUISIANA
In Louisiana, liberative prescription is a "mode of barring of actions
as a result of inaction for a period of time." 5 According to the Louisiana
Civil Code, liberative prescription may, in certain instances, be either
interrupted6 or suspended.7 However, the civil code also provides that
"[pirescription runs against all persons unless exception is established
by legislation." ' Thus, it appears that unless provided for in the civil
code or some other statutory provision, liberative prescription cannot
be interrupted or suspended. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Louis-
iana courts have adopted and further developed the doctrine of contra
non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio.
Of Roman origin,9 contra non valentem has long been recognized
by the Louisiana courts to be an exception to the running of pre-
scription.10 The frequently cited case of Reynolds v. Batson" is important
for two reasons. First, the court held that contra non valentem did not
apply to suspend the running of acquisitive prescription.' 2 Second, and
more importantly, the supreme court articulated three fact situations
where the doctrine had been applied to suspend the running of liberative
prescription:
[1] where there was some cause which prevented the courts or
their officers from acting or taking cognizance of the plaintiff's
5. La. Civ. Code art. 3447.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 3466 states: "If prescription is interrupted, the time that has
run is not counted. Prescription commences to run anew from the last day of interruption."
7. La. Civ. Code art. 3472 states: "The period of suspension is not counted toward
accrual of prescription. Prescription commences to run again upon the termination of the
period of suspension."
8. La. Civ. Code art. 3467.
Article 3467 was adopted in 1983 to replace La. Civ. Code art. 3521 of the Civil Code
of 1870. The only change in the article was the substitution of the word "legislation"
for the word "law". Official Comment (a) states that the new article did not change the
law. In addition, Official Comment (d) states that the Louisiana jurisprudence which
allows the use of contra non valentem "in exceptional circumstances .... continues to
be relevant." As authority, the comment cites Corsey v. State Dep't of Corrections, 375
So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979). See infra text accompanying notes 61-62. Therefore, when deciding
if contra non valentem should apply, the question becomes one of determining whether
the circumstances are "exceptional" or not. See infra text accompanying note 89.
9. 28 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, Traite Theorique et Pratique de Droit Civil,
Prescription, No. 367 at 192 (4th ed. L. St. L. Inst. transl. 1924).
10. Comment, The Scope of the Maxim Contra Non Valentem in Louisiana, 12 Tul.
L. Rev. 244 (1938). Because the cited article gives an excellent discussion of the history
and development of contra non valentem in both France and Louisiana, the discussion
in this paper shall be limited, for the most part, to the cases arising after 1938.
11. II La. Ann. 729 (1856).
12. Id. at 730.
NOTES
action ...
[2] where there was some condition or matter coupled with the
contract or connected with the proceeding which prevented the
creditor from suing or acting ...
[3] where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to
prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action
13
The above three categories have been cited and employed by numerous
courts. In addition to these three categories, the courts developed a
fourth category: "where the cause of action is not known or reasonably
knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by
the defendant.' ' 4 Although earlier cases had cited this reason for pre-
venting the running of prescription, 5 Corsey v. State Department of
Corrections explicitly included this fourth category to accompany the
three others set forth in Reynolds.
This fourth category has been commonly referred to as the "dis-
covery rule." However, circumstances that would warrant the use of
the discovery rule are "generically somewhat distinguishable from the
earlier situations first recognized [in Reynolds] to justify exceptions to
prescription on the basis of contra non valentem."' 6 The basis of this
distinction is that in the first three situations, the cause of action has
accrued but the plaintiff cannot assert it because of some reason "ex-
ternal to his own will. . . . "7 On the other hand, the fourth fact situation
applies because "the cause of action does not mature (so prescription
does not begin to run) until it is known or at least knowable."'" It
should also be noted that the fourth category does not apply if the
plaintiff's "ignorance is attributable to his own willfulness or neglect
... [because] a plaintiff will be deemed to know what he could by
reasonable diligence have learned."19
The above is a brief discussion of the history and application of
contra non valentem in Louisiana. Next, specific applications of the
four fact situations where the doctrine has been considered will be
discussed.
13. Id. (citations omitted).
14. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (La. 1979).
15. Henson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 711 (La. 1978); Dean
v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69 (La. 1976).
16. Corsey, 375 So. 2d at 1322.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. and cases cited therein.
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THE FIRST AND SECOND FACT SITUATIONS
The first and second fact situations set out by the court in Reynolds
v. Batson have rarely arisen in the jurisprudence. These two situations
are similar in that their use requires the existence of a condition or
conditions not associated with either the plaintiff or the defendant.
The first fact situation, "where there was some cause which pre-
vented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of the plain-
tiff's action," '20 will rarely occur today because of increased accessibility
to the courts. The Reynolds court cited two cases as justification for
this exception to the running of prescription. Quierry's Executor v.
Faussier's Executors l applied contra non valentem to suspend prescrip-
tion because of an act of the legislature which had closed the courts
as a result of wartime conditions. Ayraud v. Babin's Heirs2  involved
a plaintiff who could not bring his action for an order of seizure and
sale because he was the only judge in that district who was authorized
to adjudicate such an action and to issue the order of seizure and sale.
Thus, the court held that contra non valentem would be applied to
suspend prescription until the legislature passed an act that would au-
thorize another judge to issue the order.
The only recent case that has used this exception is Saxon v. Fire-
man's Insurance Co.,23 in which the court allowed the plaintiff to defeat
prescription because the clerk of court's office was unexpectedly closed
on the day that the cause of action was to prescribe. In an opinion
authored by the late Judge Tate, the court held that the doctrine of
contra non valentem would be applied to suspend the prescription until
the clerk's office reopened.
The second fact situation is "where there was some condition or
matter coupled with the contract or connected with the proceeding which
prevented the creditor from suing or acting." '24 As justification for this
exception, the Reynolds court cited Landry v. L'Eglise25 and Flint v.
Cuny.26 In Landry, it was alleged that a mortgage given on a promissory
note was non-enforceable because the note had prescribed. However, a
clause in the mortgage stipulated that it could not be enforced until an
earlier security device on the land was cancelled. The court held that
the presence of this clause was sufficient justification to apply contra
non valentem to defeat the claim of prescription.
20. Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729, 730.
21. 4 Mart. 609 (La. 1817).
22. 7 Mart. (n.s.) 471 (La. 1829).
23. 224 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
24. Reynolds, I I La. Ann. at 730.
25. 3 La. 219 (1832).
26. 6 La. 67 (1833).
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In Flint, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The next day, the defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. Six
days later the trial court amended its judgment. On appeal the supreme
court held that a judgment could not be amended after it had been
signed. Therefore, the second judgment was vacated. The court then
applied contra non valentem to suspend the effect of the first judgment
until the second one had been vacated.
This second fact situation has also been found in more recent cases.
Perhaps the best example of this was in Dalton v. Plumbers & Steam-
fitters Local Union No. 60,27 which was a suit by a steamfitter against
a labor union for wrongfully expelling him from the union and preventing
him from working in his trade. The union regulations had mandated
that Dalton first exhaust all his appeals to the union before filing suit.
The supreme court held that prescription could not run during the period
of time that the plaintiff could not file suit.
There are also recent cases, which use the second category, in which
the courts have noted that prescription would be suspended due to a
condition "connected with the proceeding." Where a plaintiff dismissed
her attorneys, hired new ones to assert her cause of action and, at the
same time, instituted a malpractice suit against her former attorneys,
the latter suit was held to be premature. The court reasoned that the
plaintiff might still prevail in her original cause of action. Therefore,
her malpractice suit would be unnecessary. However, the court also
noted that contra non valentem would be invoked if necessary to prevent
the running of prescription on her malpractice claim.
28
When a property owner who was ordered by an injunction to close
certain premises until health violations could be corrected was not allowed
a suspensive appeal from the order, he argued that such a closing would
end the nonconforming status of his premises. In opposing the order
he claimed that the premises had been nonconforming since before the
enactment of the health ordinance. The property owner argued that if
he were forced to close the premises while appealing the injunction, he
would lose his defense of the prior and existing nonconforming status
of the property. The court, however, indicated that contra non valentem
would operate so as to prevent the period of time that the premises
were closed from being charged against the owner. 29
Lastly, the supreme court has noted that the rule on abandonment of actions"0
27. 240 La. 246, 122 So. 2d 88 (1960).
28. Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So. 2d 372 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
29. Cantelli v. Hamlin, 83 So. 2d 563 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955).
30. La. Code Civ. P. art. 561 states: "An action is abandoned when the parties fail
to take any steps in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of five
years. . ..
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is a species of liberative prescription.3 ' When one party alleges that the
action is abandoned due to the other party's failure to take the necessary
"steps in its prosecution or defense," the latter may raise in defense of
this "prescription" claim that his failure to take action on the suit was
caused by circumstances beyond his control. When this defense has been
allowed, the courts have considered it to be the contra non valentem se-
cond fact situation.32
THE THIRD FACT SITUATION
The third fact situation set forth by the court in Reynolds is "where
the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor
from availing himself of his cause of action. ' 3  As authority for this
situation, the court cited Boyle v. Mann,34 where a debtor on a prom-
issory note had earlier fled the jurisdiction in order to avoid the creditor's
claim. The Boyle court held that contra non valentem applied to suspend
the prescriptive period of a suit to collect on the note. The Reynolds
court also cited Martin v. Jennings,3 a case factually similar to Boyle.
This third contra non valentem category has been the most frequently
used of the three set out by the Reynolds court.
The most common application of this category requires the presence
of some sort of fraud or intentional concealment on the part of the
debtbr. In some cases, usually involving automobile accidents, the courts
have held that mere ignorance of the law by the plaintiff is no reason
to suspend prescription, even if this ignorance is in some way attributable
to the defendant's insurance adjuster, who has no legal duty to correctly
inform the plaintiff of his rights. 36 On the other hand, where the plaintiff
is insured by the defendant insurance company which has intentionally
withheld benefits that it is statutorily obligated to offer, the court has
used contra non valentem to suspend the prescription to allow the insured
to assert his cause of action.37 This apparent disparity can best be
explained by the contractual nature of the latter obligation as opposed
to the delictual nature of the former obligation.
31. Melancon v. Continental Casualty Co., 307 So. 2d 308 (La. 1975).
32. Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So, 2d 372 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963)
33. Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729, 730.
34. 4 La. Ann. 170 (1849).
35. 10 La. Ann. 553 (1855).
36. Gaspard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 258 La. 357, 246 So. 2d 680 (1971); Green v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 144
So. 2d 685 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
37. Coliseum House, Inc. v. Brock, 442 So. 2d 778 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
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Other types of cases which involve the third contra non valentem
situation are inheritance cases. In West v. Gajdzik,3 8 the decedent's
daughter by his first marriage filed suit to reduce the excessive donation
caused by her father's statutory will, which left his entire estate to the
decedent's executrix, his fourth wife. The suit was filed a short time
after the plaintiff learned of her father's death, but more than four
years after the cause of action had statutorily prescribed.3 9 The defendant
admitted that although she knew that the decedent had a daughter, she
made no effort to contact her before obtaining the judgment of pos-
session because "she did not want plaintiff to share in her father's
estate.' 40 The West court held that the defendant "engaged in acts
(amounting to concealment and ill practices) which tended to hinder,
impede, and prevent plaintiff from asserting her cause of action."' 4' In
addition, the court found that the plaintiff's delay in filing suit was
"not willful, nor the result of her own negligence." ' 42 Thus, the court
reasoned, contra non valentern applied to suspend the running of pre-
scription.
Three years later the same circuit which decided the West case
addressed a similar question in Matter of Filiation of Jones.43 The
plaintiff asserted that she delayed in filing suit until after the prescriptive
period because she relied on representations made by her alleged uncles
to the effect that they would give her her deceased father's share of
her paternal grandfather's estate. However, the court held that there
was no hindrance or impediment to prevent the plaintiff from filing
suit. Thus, contra non valentern did not apply. These two cases indicate
that the defendant's actions not only must be intended to prevent the
plaintiff from filing suit, but also must actually be effective in doing
so before the court will apply contra non valentem.
There have been situations where the courts have found the doctrine
to be inapplicable. For instance, mere inability to ascertain whom to
sue, without evidence of active concealment or fraud on the part of
the defendant is not sufficient cause to invoke contra non valentem."
Recently, however, the supreme court has held that when the plaintiff's
inability to ascertain whom to sue is the result of the defendant's bad
38. 425 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 428 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 3497 (formerly La. Civ. Code art. 3542 (1870)).
40. West, 425 So. 2d at 268.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 463 So. 2d 961 (La App. 3d Cir. 1985).
44. Arceneaux v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 341 So. 2d 1287 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977); Dagenhart v. Robertson Truck Lines, Inc., 230 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1970).
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faith, prescription will be suspended until the plaintiff has "a reasonable
basis to pursue a claim against a specific defendant. ' ' 4 This distinction
is based on the contra non valentem third fact situation. In addition,
where a civil action based on a criminal act has apparently prescribed,
the courts have invoked contra non valentem to suspend the prescription
because of acts of concealment of either the civil defendant/criminal4 6
or the criminal which were attributable to the State Department of
Corrections .47
The doctrine has also been used to allow a buyer to defeat pre-
scription in his suit to avoid a sale because of redhibitory defects. At
the time of the suit, the civil code stipulated that the applicable pre-
scriptive period began to run from the date of the sale. However, because
the seller did not deliver the thing sold until three months after the
sale, the court held that the third fact situation applied, and prescription
could not begin to run until delivery.48 The court did not indicate that
it considered the defendant's actions fraudulent or intentionally con-
cealing. It merely noted that the defendant had a "legal duty" to deliver
the thing sold.49 Therefore, a breach of this duty was a sufficient "act
effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of
action.'"°0
The Reynolds third contra non valentem situation has also been
used in attorney malpractice cases. When such an action is based upon
a decision that is unsuccessfully appealed, the prescriptive period on a
subsequent attorney malpractice action by the losing party does not
begin to run until the attorney-client relationship ends." The reasoning
behind this conclusion is based on the following paradox: An adverse
judgment may be caused by the attorney's malpractice. In such a case,
45. Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So. 2d 420 (La. 1987). In Jordan, the
purchasers of a house brought a redhibition action against the vendor, the real estate
agents and the prior owners of the house. Although the real estate agent knew that the
house was structurally damaged, he withheld this knowledge as well as an engineer's
report that documented this damage. Thus, the vendor was held to be in bad faith. The
court found that the plaintiffs were reasonable in not discovering whom to sue until the
engineer's report was made available to them.
46. Herdman v. Smith, 707 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1983).
47. McClendon v. State Through Dep't of Corrections, 357 So. 2d 1218 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 359 So. 2d 1308 (La. 1978).
48. Prather v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 232 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
255 La. 1101, 234 So. 2d 195 (La. 1970).
49. Id. at 83.
50. Id. at 82.
51. Edward J. Milligan, Jr., Ltd. v. LaCaze, 509 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 512 So. 2d 420 (La. 1987); Oliver v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 499 So.
2d 1330 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Blanchard v. Reeves, 469 So. 2d 1165 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 476 So. 2d 347 (La. 1985).
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it is the attorney, not his client, who should have this knowledge. Clearly,
if the attorney does not have this knowledge, neither would the client.
Thus, the attorney should inform his client of his possible choices: either
keep the attorney and risk letting the prescriptive period run out or end
the attorney-client relationship and assert the attorney malpractice action.
The absence of such a disclosure has been the basis for invoking contra
non valentern to suspend the commencement of the prescriptive period
until the end of the attorney-client relationship.
Although medical malpractice cases usually give rise to issues re-
garding the fourth fact situation 5 2 the supreme court has recently decided
a case where the plaintiffs alleged the contra non valentem third fact
situation in order to defeat the defendant's plea of prescription. In
Gover v. Bridges," children, whose mother had died following compli-
cations from surgery, filed suit against her doctor. The plaintiffs alleged
that in a letter written by the doctor to explain the cause of death, the
doctor made inaccurate and misleading statements which assured the
plaintiffs that everything possible had been done to prevent their mother's
death. The supreme court held that the doctor's statements did not
"reach the level of either fraud or breach of duty to disclose" 5 4 such
that the contra non valentem third category would apply to defeat the
defendant's exception of prescription. Even though the court did not
find that the prescription was suspended, by reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, it implicitly indicated that the third fact situation could
still be applied to medical malpractice cases.
In 1979, the supreme court applied the doctrine to two cases which
involved the third fact situation. 5 Nathan v. Carter involved a wrongful
death action brought by the widow and children of a laborer who was
accidentally killed while working at a shipyard. Named as defendants
in the suit were the "executive officers, directors and supervisory em-
ployees . . ." and the "public liability and/or executive liability insurers
of the officers and/or employees of [the shipyard]" '5 6 The plaintiffs
alleged that the claims manager at the shipyard told the widow that a
full investigation of the accident would be made, and at the conclusion
of this investigation, she would be given a large lump sum compensation
settlement. In addition, the claims manager told the widow that if she
were to hire an attorney, "workmen's compensation benefits would be
terminated, all benefits would be cut off while the matter was litigated
52. See infra text accompanying notes 66-72.
53. 497 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1986).
54. Id. at 1369.
55. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979); Nathan v.
Carter, 372 So. 2d 560 (La. 1979).
56. Nathan, 372 So. 2d at 561.
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in court, and the litigation might last five to seven years during which
she would receive no benefits. 5 7 Five years after the accident, when
the plaintiffs were experiencing financial difficulties, the widow contacted
an attorney who filed suit within one year. After conceding that the
defendants' acts might be sufficient to suspend prescription, the lower
courts nevertheless sustained the prescription plea and held that the
plaintiffs had waited too long before filing suit. The supreme court
reversed, invoking the contra non valentem third fact situation and
holding that the defendants' actions were a "continuing threat" which
acted to suspend prescription. 8 As noted by the court,5 9 the equitable
nature of the circumstances warranted the conclusion.
In Corsey v. State Department of Corrections, authored by Justice
Tate, a prisoner at the state penitentiary sought recovery for personal
injuries that he had received approximately two years prior to filing
suit. These injuries allegedly resulted in the diminution of the plaintiff's
mental capacity such that "he lacked any understanding of what had
happened to him and of his possible legal remedies until [less than one
year before the suit]." ' 60 The lower courts dismissed the claim as pre-
scribed because the injuries had occurred two years before the suit was
filed. The supreme court, however, set forth a brief review of the
acceptance and development of contra non valentem in Louisiana, in-
cluding the characterization of the "discovery rule" as a fourth fact
situation to go along with the three others set out by the court in
Reynolds v. Batson.61 However, because the plaintiff's inability to file
suit was caused by the defendant's tortious conduct, the court held that
the third fact situation was applicable and his claim had not prescribed.
It should be noted that in Corsey there were no apparent affirmative
or fraudulent acts of the defendant which tended to hinder, impede, or
conceal the cause of action. Rather, it was the alleged tort itself which
caused such an effect. Earlier cases which had applied the third fact
situation, as noted above, involved such affirmative or fraudulent con-
duct.
TiE FOURTH FACT SITUATION - DISCOVERY RULE
The contra non valentem fourth fact situation, "[w]here the cause
of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even
though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant, ' 62 was labeled
57. Id. at 562.
58. Id. at 563.
59. Id.
60. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1320 (La. 1979).
61. 11 La. Ann. 729 (1856).
62. Corsey, 375 So. 2d at 1322.
[Vol. 48
NOTES
as such by the supreme court in Corsey. The application of this situation
to defeat a plea of prescription also requires that the plaintiff's ignorance
not be willful or negligent.63 When deciding if this basis for the doctrine
applies, the proper emphasis is on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
ignorance in not knowing whom to sue, regardless of whether or not
this ignorance was caused by the defendant. 64 Lower courts had pre-
viously interpreted Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp.6 and its progeny as
placing the focus on a "reasonable man" standard. By clarifying this
point, the supreme court has emphasized the equitable nature of the
doctrine.
Although the classification of the discovery rule as a contra non
valentem exception to the running of prescription occurred less than ten
years ago, the applicability of the fourth fact situation has been litigated
many times. Perhaps the most frequent occurrence of the fourth fact
situation has been in medical malpractice actions. For the most part,
the plaintiffs in these cases have asserted the discovery rule by claiming
that their causes of action did not begin to prescribe until they became
aware of their injuries. The courts have had to balance two different
policy considerations in deciding whether or not to apply contra non
valentem.
Support for the plaintiffs' position is found in the equitable nature
of the doctrine. Thus, prescription should not be used to prevent a
plaintiff from asserting a cause of action that does not arise until a
considerable time after the defendant's act. This conclusion is especially
apparent in medical malpractice cases where the patient may not be able
to detect the injury until sometime after it occurs.
Competing with the policy considerations favoring patient recovery
is the legislative effort to control the rising cost of medical care. By
the mid-1970's, medical malpractice cases had dramatically increased the
costs of health care. In an effort to control these costs, the legislature
enacted Louisiana Revised Statute (La. R.S.) 9:5628 which provides that:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician,
chiropractor, dentist, or hospital duly licensed under the laws
of this state, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract,
or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless
filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission
or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of
the alleged act, omission or neglect; provided, however, that
63. Id.; see also Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp., 255 La. 598, 232 So. 2d 285 (1970).
64. Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So. 2d 420, 423 (La. 1987); Griffin v.
Kinberger, 507 So. 2d 821, 823 (La. 1987).
65. 255 La. 598, 232 So. 2d 285 (1970).
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even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such
discovery, in all events such claims must be filed at the latest
within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act,
omission or neglect. 66
The main concern of the courts regarding this statute has been its possible
effect in limiting the application of the discovery rule in medical mal-
practice cases.
As indicated by the statute, a suit must be brought within one year
of the discovery of, but no later than three years of the "act, omission
or neglect." The supreme court has held that this three year limitation
is absolute.67 That is, the statute provides for a discovery rule of limited
duration. After three years, if the patient has not discovered his injury,
contra non valentem may not be used to defeat a plea of prescription.
The supreme court has also rejected various constitutional arguments
that have been advanced in opposition to this conclusion. 68
Initially, some courts of appeal held that any medical malpractice
claim brought after the effective date of La. R.S. 9:562869 could be
barred by the limitations imposed by the statute even if the "act,
omission or neglect" occurred prior to the effective date. 70 However,
the supreme court has come to the opposite conclusion and allowed the
application of the contra non valentem discovery rule to suspend the
running of prescription for more than three years on a medical mal-
practice action as long as the "act, omission or neglect" occurred before
the effective date of the statute. 7'
From the above discussion it is apparent that the application of the
doctrine has, for the most part, been based on the equitable circum-
stances of the cases. As discussed below, this consideration is also present
in the Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. Delta Development
Company case, where the court applied the third fact situation. This
use of contra non valentem was based on the admissions and stipulations
by the defendants, as well as the factual determinations. Because of
their importance, the court extensively reviewed the facts in order to
conclude that prescription would not bar the plaintiff's suit.
66. La. R.S. 9:5628 (1983).
67. Chaney v. State Through Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 432 So. 2d
256 (La. 1983).
68. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986).
69. Effective date September 12, 1975.
70. Billedeau v. Prather, 493 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Ramirez v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 441 So.
2d 212 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1106, 104 S. Ct. 1610 (1984).
71. Maltby v. Gauthier, 506 So. 2d 1190 (La. 1987).
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THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Plaquemines Parish Commission Council (hereafter PPCC), sued
Delta Development Company, Inc. (hereafter Delta) and fourteen named
individuals. The court divided the individual defendants into three groups
for the purpose of the opinion. The first group (hereafter Group 1)
consisted of Leander H. Perez, Jr. and Chalin 0. Perez, former public
officials in the parish who were the sons of the deceased public official,
Leander H. Perez, Sr. (Judge Perez). Group 1 was sued for alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties owed as public officials. The second group
(Group 2) consisted of Judge Perez's four children who received proceeds
and property from the mineral interests. The third group (Group 3)
consisted of other individuals who also received proceeds or property
from the mineral interests. The property or proceeds that the members
of the two latter groups may have received were allegedly acquired
through breaches of fiduciary duties by Judge Perez and his sons. Delta
Development Company, Inc. is a Delaware corporation (formerly a
Louisiana corporation) whose stock is either partially or entirely owned
by the members of Group 2, who received such stock through acts of
donation from their parents. PPCC's petition alleged that Judge Perez
"acquired unrecorded and secret overriding royalties in parish minerals
through ... Delta; ... acquired unrecorded and secret economic in-
terests in parish minerals through the use of interposed parties, unre-
corded documents and secret counter letters" and, furthermore, that
these interests were acquired as a result of Judge Perez's breaches of
his fiduciary duties. 72 In addition, PPCC alleged that the Group 2
defendants "engaged in ongoing schemes to keep secret the breaches of
duty and to conceal from the public knowledge of their personal gains." '7
The trial court sustained the defendants' exceptions of prescription,
finding that prescription had commenced and continued to run unin-
terrupted from 1941 to 1951. 74 In his reasons for judgment, the trial
judge misconstrued the third and fourth fact situations in holding that
"concealment . . . can only be an authoritative factor if it prevents
discovery of facts to the extent that the inquirer is effectively prevented
• . . from filing suit."' 7 Finding no reason why the plaintiff's predecessors
could not have discovered these facts, he held that contra non valentem
was inapplicable. The court of appeal adopted the trial court's conclusion
and affirmed. 76 On application to the supreme court for review, the
72. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1036-
37.
73. Id. at 1037.
74. La. Civ. Code art. 3499.
75. Transcript of trial court reasons for judgment at 14.
76. 486 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
19881
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
PPCC assigned as error the lower courts' failure to apply contra non
valentem. The supreme court agreed and held that the third fact situation
was applicable to the facts of the case. The supreme court's opinion is
rather lengthy because of the exceptional facts that gave rise to the
plaintiff's claim. The remainder of this section will be devoted to a
summarization of these facts.
From 1924 to 1960, Judge Perez was the district attorney for the
judicial district which included Plaquemines Parish. As district attorney,
he was the exclusive legal advisor to the parish governing authorities
within his district. In 1954, Leander, Jr. was appointed Assistant District
Attorney by his father and six years later was elected District Attorney.
He then appointed his father to the position of Assistant District At-
torney. Judge Perez was elected to the Plaquemines Parish Commission
Council in 1961 and served as President of the Council and Commissioner
of Public Affairs until 1967, when his other son, Chalin, was elected
to that position. Judge Perez died in 1969. Chalin held his office until
1983, and Leander, Jr. served as District Attorney until 1985.
The supreme court reviewed the "status and duties" of public of-
ficials. Because of the Louisiana courts' lack of prior consideration of
the nature and extent of the duties that are owed by public officials to
the public, the court relied on other jurisdictions in concluding that "a
public officer owes an undivided duty to the public whom he serves
and is not permitted to place himself in a position that will subject him
to conflicting duties or cause him to act other than for the best interests
of the public." '77 Next, the court stressed the high degree of trust inherent
in an attorney-client relationship as well as the attorney's duty to disclose
possible conflicts of interest. The court referred to these obligations as
fiduciary duties that the public officials owed to their constituents.
Next, the court reviewed the facts regarding the defendant's acqui-
sition of the mineral interests. PPCC's predecessors granted Delta three
mineral "base" leases of public lands, one in 1936 and two in 1938.
At that time, Judge Perez was the "ex-officio regular attorney and legal
counsel" for the lessors. 7 There is some dispute as to the exact ownership
of Delta at that time. However, it was stipulated that most of the Delta
stock was owned by Judge Perez's wife by the end of 1938, at the
latest. In addition, the court noted that "the record does not clearly
show that Perez or his wife owned stock in Delta Development Company
on August 24, 1936, when his employment agreement with Delta was
executed, although it is almost certain that they did." ' 79
77. Delta Dev., 502 So. 2d at 1039 (quoting Anderson v. City of Parsons, 496 P.2d
1333, 1337 (1972)).
78. Delta Dev., 502 So. 2d at 1041.
79. Id. at 1042 n.15.
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In each of the base leases, PPCC's predecessor received a cash
bonus and a 1/8th royalty interest. It should be noted that 1/8th was
the statutory minimum that could be given to a to a political subdivision
in granting a mineral lease. s0 After Delta acquired the lease, it entered
into the above mentioned employment agreement with Judge Perez
whereby he was to represent Delta regarding the base leases and assist
Delta in negotiating sub-leases. In return for his services, Judge Perez
was to receive cash above a certain amount that was to be given as a
bonus and any overriding royalty interests above 1/48th which he might
negotiate for Delta. The existence of this employment agreement re-
mained secret until PPCC filed suit and engaged in discovery. The court
found that the agreement created a "clear conflict of interest . . . which
aligned Judge Perez with the lessee, Delta . . . to the detriment of his
statutory client, [PPCC's predecessor].""1
In the sub-leases granted by Delta, the sub-lessees were willing to,
and did, in fact, give up more than a 1/8th royalty interest. However,
this additional royalty interest was acquired by Judge Perez and Delta
by way of secret employment agreements and unrecorded counter letters.
Also, because of the actions of Judge Perez and/or his sons, the PPCC
or its predecessor lost out on possible claims for additional sums arising
out of its leases in the disputed areas.82 Because the defendants had
stipulated for the resolution of the prescription issue that these breaches
of fiduciary duties had occurred, the court was not obligated to place
so much emphasis on the above facts in order to reach its decision.
However, its reason for doing so became apparent when it stated that
"[a] review of the record clearly indicates the manner in which those
breaches of fiduciary duty occurred, even though that was simply stip-
ulated, and the case has not yet been tried on the merits." 3 The effect
of such a statement was to send a clear signal to the lower courts:
Even though the defendants had stipulated the breaches of fiduciary
duties, the supreme court set forth its factual determination of these
breaches. A lower court would not be likely to derogate from these
findings when the question arose during the trial.
Judge Perez's alleged improprieties did not end after the original
granting of the mineral leases and the sub-leases. After the leases were
granted, rumors began circulating and newspaper articles were written
concerning the possible improprieties of Judge Perez. The lower courts
were under the impression that the existence of these facts alone were
sufficient cause not to apply contra non valentem. However, as noted
80. 1928 La. Acts No. 66.
81. Delta Dev., 502 So. 2d at 1042.
82. Id. at 1044-45 n.17.
83. Id. at 1045-46.
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above, this conclusion was based upon the fourth fact situation and
was not determinative in the supreme court's resolution of the issue,
which involved application of the third fact situation.
During the eight years following the granting of the leases, numerous
attempts were made to substantiate the claims made against Judge Perez.
Each time such an attempt was made, Judge Perez was successful in
having them quashed. In doing so, however, Judge Perez represented
to the courts that he was "ready and willing and [was] capable of
representing [PPCC's predecessors] as their attorney" and "would advise
them honestly, sincerely, and to the best interest of the Parish of
Plaquemines. '8 4 This statement clearly showed Judge Perez's willingness
and desire to misrepresent his interests so that his true interests would
remain concealed. This misrepresentation was accomplished by way of
Judge Perez's status as a public official. After a lengthy portrayal of
the above facts, the court went into its discussion of contra non valentem
and how these facts could be used to defeat the defendants' pleas of
prescription.
APPLICATION OF Contra Non Valentern TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE
After reviewing the facts of the case, the supreme court discussed
the history and application of contra non valentern in Louisiana. The
court noted the major distinction between the three Reynolds fact si-
tuations and the more recent fourth fact situation, the discovery rule. 85
In attempting to defeat PPCC's reliance on the doctrine, the defendants
pointed out that the recent amendment to La. Civ. Code art. 3467
indicated a legislative attempt to abolish the doctrine.8 6 The court rea-
soned that had this effect been intended, it would have been expressly
stipulated in the revision. In addition, since the revision, the supreme
court had recognized the doctrine in several other cases.17 However,
these cases involved the fourth fact situation, whereas PPCC's claim
was based on the third situation. Therefore, one important result of
this case is that it reinforces the viability of the Reynolds fact situations.
As noted in the opinion and observed through a review of the
various applications of contra non valentem, the underlying bases for
applying the doctrine are equity and a sense of fairness. Whether it
explicitly does so or not, each court that considers the applicability of
the doctrine should consider these bases in making its determination. It
84. Id. at 1050.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
86. See supra text accompanying note 8.




is submitted that these bases make the case "exceptional" under the
terms of the comment to La. Civ. Code art. 3467.88 In a given lawsuit,
if the plaintiff's claim is not conducive to a sense of equity and fairness,
the doctrine should not be applied. This result can be achieved by
distinguishing the particular facts of that case from the prior decisions
where the doctrine has been upheld.
After a general contra non valentem discussion, the court concluded
that the third situation was applicable to the facts. As noted above,
this application was based on the fiduciary nature of the duties owed
by the Perezes in their capacity as public officials. Because of this
fiduciary nature, the PPCC and its predecessors were "effectually pre-
vented" from asserting its claims against its fiduciary. The court also
considered the underlying basis for applying the doctrine when it noted
that "[tihis case presents a situation with probably more compelling
considerations of equity, justice and fairness than any which can be
found in the jurisprudence. '89 This broad conclusion demonstrates the
great weight given to policy considerations by the court in reaching its
conclusion.
Next, the court considered the application of the doctrine to defeat
the pleas of prescription of those defendants not in Group 1. As to
Delta, the court concluded that because of the conduct of Judge Perez
and his sons that gave rise to the above application of contra non
valentem, the corporation should also be held responsible. This conclu-
sion is based on the near identity of interests between the corporation
and the Perezes which is discussed above. As to the other defendants,
Groups 2 and 3, who received their proceeds or property interests by
way of donations, the court concluded that the PPCC and its prede-
cessors were also "effectually prevented" from asserting their claims
against these defendants.
As noted in the beginning of this paper, the first and second fact
situations rarely occur in the jurisprudence. However, Delta Develop-
ment's reaffirmance of the applicability of the third situation after the
adoption of La. Civ. Code art. 3467 implicitly reaffirms the applicability
of the first two fact situations, should they occur.
At first glance, allowing PPCC to bring suit at this late date seems
harsh. Upon further review of the applicability of contra non valentem
and the specific facts of this case, however, this harshness is somewhat
mitigated. Clearly from an equitable point of view, the result is correct. 9°
Mark D. Latham
88. See supra note 8.
89. Delta Dev., 502 So. 2d at 1057.
90. In December of 1987, the Plaquemines Parish Council agreed to an out of court
settlement of its claims against Delta Development Company and all but two of Judge
Perez's descendants.
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